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Вниманию наших читателей представляется статья Билла Бауринга, при-
уроченная редколлегией журнала к 90-летию со дня рождения выдающегося 
российского философа Э.В. Ильенкова. Публикацией данной работы журнал 
продолжает исследовательскую традицию в области диалектической логики, в 
развитие которой Эвальд Васильевич внес неоценимый вклад. 
Автор статьи – Билл Бауринг – живет в Колчестере, самом старом городе 
Англии, преподает в Университете Лондона, является профессором права и ба-
калавром по специальности «Философия». Со студенческих лет он увлекается 
философией Спинозы и является его поклонником. Знакомство Билла Бауринга 
с творчеством  Э.В. Ильенкова состоялось в 1979 г., когда партия, в которую он 
входил, осуществляла перевод и публикацию «Ленинской диалектики и мета-
физики позитивизма» Э.В. Ильенкова, и все читали его «Диалектику абстрактно-
го и конкретного в «Капитале» Маркса». Автор не изменяет своей первой любви 
– философии и продолжает изучение творческого наследия выдающегося фило-
софа, выступая в дискуссиях и научных обсуждениях не только в своей стране, но 
и за рубежом. В Англии существует круг поклонников творчества Э.В. Ильенко-
ва, есть интернет веб-сайт. 
УДК 1(091)141
Bill Bowring – Birkbeck College, University of  London
WHAT IF  ILYENKOV HAD KNOWN  MARX’S 
TRANSCRIPTION OF  SPINOZA?
Introduction. My own interest in Spinoza was sparked by reading, in the early 1980s, one 
of the later works of  E.V. Ilyenkov (1924–1979), for me the most interesting of the philosophers 
working in the USSR, his Dialectical Logic, especially Essay Two, «Thought as an Attribute of 
Extension».* Ilyenkov also made extensive reference to Spinoza** in the first two sections of Chapter 
One of the revised version, for translation into German in 1979, of  The Dialectics of  the Abstract 
and Concrete in Marx’s Capital (Abstract and Concrete), first published  in Russian in 1960, and 
in English in 1982.*** It is a curious fact, to which I will return, that all  Ilyenkov’s references in 
Dialectical Logic but one are to Spinoza’s Ethics, with one reference to On the Improvement of  the 
Understanding (Improvement), while all the references in Abstract and Concrete are to Spinoza’s 
Improvement. I wonder whether Ilyenkov only had Volume 1 of the two volume Selected Works.
* E.V. Ilyenkov (1977) Dialectical Logic (Moscow: Progress) – published in Russian by Politicheskaya Literatura 
in 1974.
** Ilyenkov’s engagement with Spinoza was through the Collected Works in two very handsome volumes, 
with a variety of translations, published in 1957 (Moscow: Politicheskaya Literatura), in a large edition of  30 
000. Vol 1 contained: an introduction by V. V. Sokolov; A Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being 
(translated by A. I. Rubin); The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy (translated by V. V. Sokolov) ; Appendix 
on Metaphysical Thought (translated by V. V. Sokolov); On the Improvement of the Understanding (translated 
by Ya. M. Vorovskiy); Ethics (translated  by N. A. Ivantsov). Volume 2 contained:  A Theologico-Political 
Treatise (translated by M. Lopatkina); Political Treatise (translated by S. M. Rogovin and  V. V. Chredin); 
Correspondence (translated by V.K. Brushlinskiy).
*** E.V. Ilyenkov (1982) The Dialectics of the Abstract and Concrete in Marx’s Capital (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers) revised edition for  translation into German 1979, first published in Russia in 1960.
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Ilyenkov was, as far as I know, not aware of the fact that in March to April 1841, 
at the age of  22, Karl Marx made extensive transcriptions from Spinoza, together 
with other philosophers as I outline below, as part of  his reading for his doctoral thesis 
The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of  Nature.* 
These notebooks were published by Dietz Verlag in the GDR in 1976, a year before 
Ilyenkov’s death, in two volumes. Volume 1 contains Marx’s transcriptions in Latin 
and German; Volume II contains translations from Latin into German, and notes, the 
«Apparat». A translation into French, by Maximilien Rubel, with an Introduction by 
Rubel, appeared in 1977.**
Marx had a calligrapher to transcribe at length in Latin, using the 1802 edition of 
Spinoza’s works published  in Jena, from the Theologico-Political Treatise, and from 
the Correspondence, but not at all from Improvement or Ethics.***
The following questions arise for consideration in this paper. Were Marx and 
Ilyenkov reading, in effect, two quite different Spinozas? Or was each of them 
reading Spinoza instrumentally, in order further to develop their own ideas?
Ilyenkov and Spinoza
As Sergei Mareev points out****, although Ilyenkov’s views were formed under 
the influence of  Marx and German classical philosophy, both he and L. S. Vygotsky 
gave tremendous significance to Spinoza’s ideas. Mareev argues that Ilyenkov did 
not simply continue the «line» of  Spinoza in Soviet philosophy; for the first time 
he «opened» Spinoza to Mareev and his generation. Before Ilyenkov the Soviet 
philosophical public knew Spinoza as a mechanical determinist, or as Spinoza the 
atheist. The last Soviet and first post-Soviet textbooks on Spinoza interpreted him 
in the spirit of Stalin’s «diamat», as a Cartesian dualist.
Nevertheless, in the collection Evald Ilyenkov’s Philosophy Revisited, published in 
2000 following a Symposium in 1999*****, Spinoza did not make much of an appearance. 
An exception was the section «Iljenkow und das zweite Buch der “Ethik”«, in 
Wolfgang  Jantzen’s chapter «Leontjew, Iljenkow und die Meschetscherjakow-Debatte 
– Methodologische Bemerkungen».****** Nikolai Veresov, in his chapter «Vygotsky, 
Ilyenkov and  Mamardashvili» discussed Ilyenkov’s attitude to A. N. Leontiev’s 
«psychological theory of activity». He wrote:
«The main role of such a theory comprised the concept of activity (Tätigheit, 
deiatelnost’). Activity for Ilyenkov was not a super-category or explanatory 
* Karl Marx (1976) Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), IV Vierte Abteilung : Exzerpte Notizen 
Marginalien Band 1(Berlin: Dietz Verlag).
** Maximilien Rubel (1977) “Marx à la rencontre de Spinoza” and “Karl Marx: Le Traité Théologico-
Politique et la Correspondance de Spinoza: trios cahiers d’étude de l’année 1841” Cahiers Spinoza 
Numéro 1 Éditions Réplique, Paris, pp.7–159.
*** Marx used the edition edited by Henr[-icus] Eberh[ard] Gottlob Paulus (1802) Benedictus de Spinoza: 
Opera quae supersunt omnia. Iterum dedenda curavit…. Vol 1. Ienae. 
**** Sergei Mareev (2007) “Spinoza v sovetskoi filosofii (Spinoza in Soviet philosophy)” 2 (59) Logos  187–
200, at http://www.ruthenia.ru/logos/number/59/11.pdf,  p. 198.
***** Vesa Oittinen (ed) (2000) Evald Ilyenkov’s Philosophy Revisited (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications).
****** Oittinen (2000) p. 85–88.
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principle. On the contrary, and following Spinoza and Marx, activity was treated 
as a substance from which both subject and object derive».*
A. G. Novokhatko, of the Spinoza Archive, however, contributed a whole 
chapter, Ilyenkov i Spinoza (Ilyenkov and Spinoza).** Although much of the chapter 
concerned Ilyenkov’s relations with Vygotsky and Leontiev, and his critique of 
Fichte, the  author  selected the following passage from Dialectical Logic:
Only by proceeding from the idea of substance could the thinking body 
understand both itself and the reality with and within which it operated and about 
which it thought… having once understood the mode of its action (i.e. thought), 
the thinking body just so comprehended substance as the absolutely necessary 
condition of interaction with the external world.***
The collection ended with the publication for the first time of Ilyenkov’s 1970 
«The Science of  Logic».****  This did not refer to Spinoza. However, the passage cited 
by Novokhatko correctly identified Ilyenkov’s main innovation, and his main point 
of  departure from Spinoza, his concept of the «thinking body» (mysliashchee telo).
According  to Mareev, for Ilyenkov Spinoza was first and foremost a monist. 
He cites a famous passage from Dialectical Logic:
«The brilliance of the solution of  the problem of the relation of thinking to 
the world of bodies in space outside thought (i.e. outside the head of man), which 
Spinoza formulated in the form of the thesis that thought and extension are not two 
substances, but only two attributes of one and the same substance, can hardly be 
exaggerated. This solution immediately rejected every possible kind of interpretation 
and investigation of  thought by the logic of spiritualist and dualist constructions…».*****
Ilyenkov’s  special contribution was his assertion that
There are not two different and originally contrary objects of investigation – body 
and thought – but only one single object, which is the thinking body of living, real, man 
(or other analogous being, if such exists anywhere in the Universe), only considered 
from two different and even opposing aspects or points of view.******
According to Ilyenkov, this «simple and profoundly true idea», that thought  is a 
property, a mode of existence of the body, the same as its extension, was expressed  by 
Spinoza in the language of his time, as the insistence that thought and extension are 
two attributes of  one and the same substance «real infinite Nature». Ilyenkov’s original 
assertion was that «It is in man that Nature really performs, in a self-evident way, that 
very activity that we are accustomed to call ‘thinking’».*******
Later, in the revised edition of Abstract and Concrete, Ilyenkov  pointed  out 
what in his view was wrong with Spinoza:
* Oittinen (2000) p. 137.
** Oittinen (2000) p. 293–306.
*** Ilyenkov (1977) p. 60–61.
**** Oittinen (2000) p. 331–372.
***** Ilyenkov (1977) p. 43.
****** Ilyenkov (1977) p. 31.
******* Ilyenkov (1977) p. 32.
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It would hardly be appropriate to discuss here the short-comings of Spinoza’s 
conception, as they are well known: Spinoza failed to understand the connection 
between thinking and practical activity with objects, between theory and  practice, 
the role of practice as the only objective criterion of  the truth of  a concrete concept.*
In other words, Spinoza failed to grasp the concept of  the «thinking body», as 
well as the fact that, according to Ilyenkov, the human intellect comes into being 
through the co-activity of  the hand and the mind.
Ilyenkov in the Marxist context
In his approach to Spinoza, Ilyenkov most certainly departed from Diamat. 
But he followed an approach to Spinoza which can be traced through Hegel to 
Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Bukharin.
G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) was a close reader and critic of Spinoza, but insisted 
in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that «It is therefore worthy of note that 
thought must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of  Spinozism; to be a follower 
of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all Philosophy».** In his The Science of 
Logic (1812) , in his «Remark; The Philosophy of Spinoza and Leibniz»*** he wrote 
: «Determinateness is negation – is the absolute principle of Spinoza’s philosophy; 
this true and simple insight establishes the absolute unity of substance».**** In the 
chapter on «The Notion in General» he wrote Besides, a standpoint so lofty and so 
intrinsically rich as the relation of substance, far from ignoring those assumptions 
even contains them: one of the attributes of Spinoza’s substance is thinking.*****
Ilyenkov was most certainly aware of these passages.
I will return to Marx below; but Plekhanov relayed the following, often-cited 
conversation between himself and Engels:  
«Thus, according to you» I asked «old Spinoza was right when he said that 
thought and extension are nothing other than two attributes of  one and the same 
substance?» «Of  course “answered Engels “old Spinoza was completely right».******
Engels himself very rarely referred to Spinoza directly, but the following 
passage from the Introduction to his Dialectics of Nature is thoroughly Spinozist 
in tone and content: «… we have the certainty that matter remains eternally the 
same in all its transformations, that none of its attributes can ever be lost, and 
therefore, also, that with the same iron necessity that it will exterminate on the 
earth its highest creation, the thinking mind, it must somewhere else and at another 
time again produce it».*******
* Ilyenkov (1982) p. 22.
** G.W. F .Hegel (1995)  Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Medieval and Modern Philosophy. Volume 3 
(Lincoln: University of  Nebraska Press, 1995), Spinoza 252-289, at p. 257.
*** Hegel’s Science of Logic (1969) Translated by A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin) p.536-
40).
**** Hegel (1969) p. 536. 
***** Hegel (1969) pp. 580–581.
****** Conversation Plekhanov and Engels – G.V. Plekahnov Sochineniya Vol.20 p.363; or  G. V. Plekhanov 
“Bernstein and Materialism”. In Sochineniya Vol.XI (Moscow-Petrograd, 1923)  p. 22.
******* F. Engels (1964)  Dialectics  of  Nature (1883) Third Revised Edition (Moscow: Progress Publishers) p. 40.
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Plekhanov in turn considered  that «contemporary materialism… is more or 
less based on Spinozism».* And in his 1908 Materialismus Militans (Reply to Mr 
Bogdanov)** he wrote in a footnote:
According to Spinoza, the thing (res) is the body (corpus) and at the same time 
the idea of the body (idea corporis). But since he who perceives himself, also has 
a perception of his own perception, the thing is a body (corpus), the idea of a body 
(idea corporis) and finally the idea of the idea of  the body (idea ideae corporis). It 
can be seen from this how close Feuerbach’s materialism is to Spinoza’s teaching.
Lenin followed Hegel’s lead. In his «Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of  Logic» 
he wrote:  «Determinateness is negation…» (Spinoza) Omnis determinatio est 
negatio, «this statement is of immeasurable importance…».*** 
Nikolai Bukharin was, after Lenin, the most philosophically-minded Bolshevik 
leader****. In his Philosophical Arabesques, written in prison following his arrest on 27 
February 1937, he showed his deep sympathy with Spinoza*****. He referred to «… the 
totality of everything concrete… All the storms of becoming are played out in it, and it 
itself “flows” in infinite time and space, which exist merely as forms of its being. This 
is the great substance of Spinoza’s causu sui; it is natura naturans and natura naturata 
simultaneously, stripped of their theological baggage.******
Answering critics of Bolshevik «idealism», he wrote: «In the first place our 
worthy opponents are no doubt aware that Plekhanov defined Marxism (of course 
with a grain of salt) as a type of  Spinozism. And we all know what Spinozism is».******* 
In a section on «Freedom and Necessity», Bukharin wrote the following in relation 
to Lenin’s Conspectus of  Hegel’s Science of  Logic:
This is precisely the same view that Spinoza presented in his renowned Ethics, a 
view he «demonstrated» more geometrico, or in an exact «geometric manner».
Spinoza protested in every possible way against the widespread view that 
«human beings have unlimited strength and depend on nothing apart from 
themselves». Spinoza seized brilliantly on this fundamental, this abstract vacuity 
of «pure will» taken «in itself», that is, outside of all relationships. Pure will is in 
fact a myth, although the sensation associated with an act of  will may be one of 
complete freedom.  «A child thus imagines that it freely wants the milk that feeds 
it; it gets angry, it thinks it freely seeks revenge; if it gets scared, that it freely 
* G.V. Plekhanov (1956) Izbranniye filosofskiye proizvedeniyai (Collected philosophical works) Moscow 
Vol.2, p. 339.
** G.V. Plekhanov (1973) Voinstvuyushchii Materializm  (Materialismus Militans (Reply to Mr Bogdanov) 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers).
*** V.I. Lenin (1963)  Collected Works Vol.38 Philosophical Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p.108.
**** Burzhuaziya (Baruch Spinoza and the Bourgeoisie) Bibliotek “Ogonyok” Zhurnalno-gazetnoye 
obyedineniye, Moscow 1933 at http://www.situation.ru/app/j_art_1114.htm – a thoroughly superficial 
account.
***** Nikolai Bukharin (2005) Philosophical Arabesques (London: Pluto Press).
****** Bukharin (2005)  p. 90–91.
******* Bukharin (2005)  p. 175.
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wants to run away».* But here, as we see, what is always involved is necessity 
in Aristotle’s third sense, and it is only about this necessity that we are talking 
in the present instance. This necessity is the main object, the center of the whole 
problem; in no way is it the «constraint» mentioned by Aristotle.
Ilyenkov would not have known of  these writings; but Bukharin would not 
have been alone among the Bolsheviks in his enthusiastic interest in Spinoza.
Ilyenkov’s instrumental engagement with Spinoza – Dialectical Logic
I have already indicated that  Ilyenkov quoted from two texts of Spinoza only. 
His use of them was in my view entirely instrumental, in the sense that he took 
Spinoza as assisting him in working out his own philosophy.
H. Campbell Creighton, the translator of  Dialectical Logic, did not seek to 
translate the Russian of  the translation from Latin by N. A. Ivantsov from which 
Ilyenkov drew, but instead used that of  W. H. White from Great Books of  the 
Western World. A much better translation into English in my view is that of  the 
Spinoza scholar Edwin Curley in the Penguin edition (Penguin).**
In Dialectical Logic, in only the second essay out of  eleven, Ilyenkov’s 
aim was to establish his concept of  the «thinking body». In order to do so, his 
citations from Ethics were selective and in some respects contrary to Spinoza’s 
own teaching. Not that  Ilyenkov should be criticised for this. He was not writing 
an exposition of  Spinoza.***
Andrey Maidanskiy analysed precisely this substantial difference between 
Ilyenkov and Spinoza in 2002. He wrote.**** 
In the texts of Spinoza the expression «thinking body» (corpus cogitans) is 
nowhere to be found. Moreover, Spinoza directly states that the thinking thing is 
the mind, and not the body: «Part II Definition 3: By idea I understand a concept of 
the mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing».*****
In Spinoza’s Metaphysical Thoughts the term res cogitans is defined precisely: 
We have said that the human mind is a thinking thing. From this it follows that, 
merely from its own nature and considered only in itself (ex sola sua natura, in se 
sola spectata), it can do something, to wit, think, that is, affirm and deny.****** 
Thus it is not the body, but the mind which thinks. Ilyenkov without any basis 
saw in Spinoza’s philosophy a directly contradictory truth: «It is not a special 
* Penguin (1996)  p. 73.
** Benedict de Spinoza (1996) Ethics translated by Edwin Curley (London: Penguin Books).
*** This point is made by Vesa Oittinen (2005) “Evald Il’enkov as an Interpreter of Spinoza” v.57 n.3 
Studies in East European Thought pp. 319–338.
**** Andrey Maidansky (2002) “Ponyatiye myshleniya u Ilyenkova i Spinozy (The concept of thinking in 
Ilyenkov and Spinoza)” 8 Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy) pp. 163–173, at. http://caute.ru/
am/text/cogitatio.html (accessed on 23 January 2013).
***** Penguin (1996) p. 32.
****** Spinoza (2002) Complete Works (translations by Samuel Shirley) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company) Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, Part II, Chapter 12, p. 209.
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«soul» that  thinks… but the body of  man itself».*  However, according  to 
Spinoza, the body does not think, it is only the object of some ideas (and by no 
means all). Maidansky cites Spinoza’s Letter IV, addressed to Henry Oldenburg, 
a passage transcribed by Marx as I show below: «… you say: perhaps thought is 
a corporeal action… I by no means grant it…».** In an article published in English 
a year later***, Maidansky observed that  for Ilyenkov, while Spinoza had rightly 
defined the relation of  the ideal to the real in general, he could not solve the riddle 
of  the birth of  the human intellect. Ilyenkov’s advance on Spinoza was to hold that 
the ideal arises from real action, the co-action of  a hand with an external thing.****
Having correctly cited several propositions of Spinoza on pages 61 to 68, 
footnotes 10, 14 and 15, Ilyenkov argued the following:
In other words, an adequate idea is only the conscious state of our body 
identical in form with the thing outside the body. This can be represented quite 
clearly. When I describe a circle with my hand on a piece of paper (in real space), 
my body, according to Spinoza, comes into a state fully identical with the form 
of the circle outside my body, into a state of real action in the form of a circle. 
My body (my hand) really describes a circle, and the awareness of this state (i.e. 
of the form of my own action in the form of the thing) is also the idea, which is, 
moreover, ‘adequate’.*****
Ilyenkov gave no reference for this, and, indeed, there is none. This passage 
appears nowhere in Spinoza. Ilyenkov was putting his own philosophy into 
Spinoza’s mouth. As will be seen, Ilyenkov may well have had in mind a passage 
from the OIU, but this is not Spinoza. In fact, in Ilyenkov’s thought, Spinoza’s 
teaching had  been transmuted into «action philosophy».
Immediately after this passage, Ilyenkov cited Postulates IV and VI in Part II 
«Of  the Mind» of  Ethics******, and the White translation is good enough. He then cited 
the last sentence of the proof (demonstration) of  Proposition 14, out  of context. 
The passage as a whole reads, in the Penguin translation*******:
P. 14: The human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the 
more capable, the more its body can be disposed in a great many ways.
Dem: For the human body is affected in a great many ways by external bodies, 
and is disposed to affect external bodies in a great many ways. But the human mind 
must perceive everything which happens in the human body. Therefore, the human 
mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable [-,NS: 
as the human body is more capable], q.e.d.
* Ilyenkov (1977) p. 32.
** Elwes Corr (1951) p. 283.
*** Andrey Maidansky (2003) “The Russian Spinozists” 55 Studies in East European Thought pp.199–216.
**** Maidansky (2003)  pp. 209–210.
***** Ilyenkov (1977) p. 69.
****** Penguin (1996)  p. 44.
******* Penguin (1996) p. 44.
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Ilyenkov continued*:
In other words, the more numerous and varied the means it has to ‘move and 
arrange external bodies’, the more it has ‘in common’ with other bodies.
But this is not Spinoza’s position at all; Ilyenkov was not simply paraphrasing 
Spinoza. He was developing his own activity theory.
A page or so later**, Ilyenkov cited Proposition 39 of Spinoza. In the Penguin 
translation it is as follows:
P. 39: If something is common to, and peculiar to, the human body and certain 
external bodies by which the human body is usually affected, and is equally in the 
part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will also be adequate to the mind.
Ilyenkov did not cite the demonstration.
Cor (corollary).: From this it follows that the mind is the more capable of 
perceiving many things adequately as its body has many things in common with 
other bodies.
In the text of Dialectical Logic, this was completely garbled. Ilyenkov returned 
to Proposition 38, and the following, in the Penguin translation:
From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or notions, common to all 
men. For all bodies agree in certain things, which must be perceived adequately, or 
clearly and distinctly, by all.
And then on the same page Ilyenkov went right back to Proposition 26:
P. 26: The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, 
except through the ideas of the affections of its own body.***
Thus, Ilyenkov reversed Spinoza’s logical sequence; and then jumped almost 
to the end of the Ethics to Part V, «Of Human Freedom», Proposition 39:
P. 39: He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose 
greatest part is eternal.****
Ilyenkov stated***** that there follows from this Proposition something which in 
Spinoza’s text precedes it by several pages, and again took a line (shown underlined) 
out of context, which is part of  the proof of  Proposition  25 in Part V.
P. 25: The greatest striving of the mind, and its greatest virtue is understanding 
things by the third kind of knowledge.
Dem: The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain 
attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things, and the more 
we understand things in this way, the more we understand God. Therefore, the 
greatest virtue of the mind, that is, the mind’s power, or nature, or its greatest 
striving, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.******
* Ilyenkov (1977) p. 69.
** Ilyenkov (1977) p. 71.
*** Penguin (1996) p. 50. 
**** Penguin (1996) p. 178.
***** Ilyenkov (1977) p. 72.
****** Penguin (1996) p. 173.
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From this selective arrangement Ilyenkov extracted the following:
Therefore the real composition of psychic activity (including the logical 
component of thought) is not in the least determined by the structure and 
arrangement of the parts of the human body and brain, but by the external conditions 
of universally human activity in the world of other bodies.*
But this again is Ilyenkov’s «activity philosophy» and has nothing to do with 
Spinoza’s own teaching.
There is one further citation from Spinoza in Dialectical Logic, although the 
English translation omits the footnote which is to be found in Ilyenkov’s Russian 
text. In Essay 8, «The Materialist Conception of  Thought  as the Subject Matter of 
Logic», Ilyenkov elaborated on his central concept of  the ideal:
Determination of the ideal is thus especially dialectical. It is that which is not, 
together with that which is, that which does not exist in the form of an external, 
sensuously perceived thing but at the same time does exist as an active faculty of man.**
For this he quoted not from the Ethics, but from Improvement, as follows:
A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must explain the inmost essence of 
a thing, and must take care not to substitute for this any of its properties… If a 
circle is defined as a figure, such that all straight lines drawn from the centre to the 
circumference are equal, everyone can see that such a definition does not in the 
least explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its properties.
I. If the thing in question be created, the definition must (as we have said) 
comprehend the proximate cause. For instance, a circle should, according to this rule, 
be defined as follows: the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the 
other free. This definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause.***
Once again, it can be seen that Ilyenkov’s  appropriation of  Spinoza was 
undertaken not  in order to explain Spinoza, but  to advance his own philosophical 
position – which is, of  course, not a criticism. Ilyenkov created his own Spinoza, 
the better to express his original ideas.
Ilyenkov’s instrumental engagement with Spinoza – The Dialectics of the 
Abstract and Concrete in Marx’s Capital
It would  appear that  Ilyenkov added to Abstract and Concrete a passage 
referring to Spinoza in the very last years of  his life; Abstract and Concrete was first 
published in Russia in 1960, but  without that passage. The translator of  the  English 
version, Sergei Syrovatkin, used the standard  Elwes translation of Improvement.
Ilyenkov started**** with the following:
Consistent materialists realised the weakness of the nominalistic view of the 
concept, its vulnerability to idealist speculations and errors. Spinoza stressed that 
* Ilyenkov (1977) p. 72.
** Ilyenkov (1977) p. 264.
*** Spinoza “On the improvement of the understanding” Dover Edition 1955 Volume 2, translated by R. H. 
M. Elwes, p. 35 – Elwes.
**** Ilyenkov (1982) p. 17.
What if  Ilyenkov had Known Marx’s Transcription of  Spinoza?
22      Әл-Фараби  |  1 (45) 2014      
the concept of substance, expressing the «first principle of nature», «cannot be 
conceived abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in the understanding 
than it does in reality».
In fact the passage in question is:
But since the first principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be 
conceived abstractly or universally, and cannot extend further in the understanding 
than it does in reality, and has no likeness to mutable things, no confusion need 
be feared in respect to the idea of it, provided (as before shown) that we possess a 
standard of truth. That is, in fact, a being single and infinite; in other words, it is the 
sum total of being, beyond which there is no being found.
Ilyenkov therefore omitted the heart of  Spinoza’s notion of  substance.
On the following  page, Ilyenkov attributed to Spinoza  a reference to «the mode 
of ‘chaotic experience’ uncontrolled by reason».* This is not to be found in Spinoza, 
and the passage cited, jumping back several pages in Improvement, is:
The second mode of perception cannot be said to give us the idea of the 
proportion of which we are in search. Moreover its results are very uncertain 
and indefinite, for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its 
means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly understood, unless the 
essence of the things in question be known first.**
For a critique of  Spinoza, Ilyenkov cited a long passage:
Now that we know what kind of  knowledge is necessary for us, we must 
indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain the said knowledge 
concerning the things needful to be known. In order to accomplish this, we must 
first take care not to commit ourselves to a search going back to infinity – that is, 
in order to discover the best method for finding out the truth, there is no need of 
another method to discover such a method; nor of  a third method for discovering 
the second, and so on to infinity. By such proceedings, we should never arrive at 
the knowledge of the truth, or, indeed any knowledge at all. The matter stands on 
the same footing as the making of material tools, which might be argued about 
in a similar way. For, in order to work iron, a hammer is needed, and the hammer 
cannot  be forthcoming unless it has been made; but, in order to make it, there 
was need of another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity. We might 
thus vainly endeavour to prove that men have no power of working iron. But as 
men at first made use of the instruments supplied by nature to accomplish very 
easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously and imperfectly, and then, when these 
were finished, wrought other things more difficult with less labour and greater 
perfection; and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making 
of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex tools and 
fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, with small expenditure 
of labour, the vast number  of complicated mechanisms which they now possess. 
* Ilyenkov (1982) p. 18.
** Elwes (1955) p. 11.
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So, in like manner, the intellect, by its native strength, makes for itself intellectual 
instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other intellectual 
operations, and from these operations gets again fresh instruments or the power 
of pushing its investigations further,  and thus gradually proceeds until it reaches 
the summit of wisdom.*
Ilyenkov’s gloss was as follows:
Here Spinoza attempts a fundamentally materialist interpretation of the 
innateness of ‘intellectual instruments’, deducing it from man’s natural organisation 
rather than from the ‘God’ of Descartes or Leibniz.
What Spinoza failed to understand was the fact that the originally imperfect 
‘intellectual instruments’ are products of material labour rather than of nature… 
that is merely an organic shortcoming of the entire old materialism.**
Finally, Ilyenkov cited the passage we have already seen, concerning the 
definition of  a circle, also cited in Essay 8 of  Dialectical Logic.
Spinoza was therefore not, for  Ilyenkov, «Marx without the beard»; rather, 
Spinoza in his hands was an effective weapon, suitably adapted, in the war against 
Diamat, all  the better for carrying the seal of approval of the Marxist and Bolshevik 
tradition.
Marx and Spinoza
Marx began his philosophical notebooks in 1839, with materials for his doctoral 
dissertation The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy 
of  Nature, which he submitted in 1841.*** He made 141 pages of transcripts of 
Epicurean Philosophy – Diogenes, Epicurus, Sextus  Empiricus, Democritus, 
Epikurus and others, and Seneca to the beginning of 1840. In 1840 he made 27 
pages of transcripts from Aristotle’s De Anima (On the Soul); in March 1841 29 
pages of  transcripts from Leibniz  in Latin and French; from January to March 
1841 19 pages of  transcripts from David Hume in German translation; from March 
to April 1841 43 pages of  transcripts in Latin from Spinoza; during the same 
period 11 pages of  transcripts from Rozencranz’s History of Kantian Philosophy; 
and from the beginning of April to the end of May 1842 87 pages of  transcripts 
on the History of  Art and Religion – the Bonn notebook. The transcriptions from 
Spinoza were the most substantial.
It will be recalled that in the first half of 1842 Marx was engaged in polemical 
journalism, in defence of  freedom of expression, his «Comments on the Latest 
Prussian Censorship Instruction»**** and, in the Rheinische Zeitung, «Debates on 
Freedom of  the Press and Publication of  the Proceedings of  the Assembly of the 
* Ilyenkov (1982) p. 19; Elwes (1955) pp. 11–12.
** Ilyenkov (1982) pp. 19–20.
*** Karl Marx (1975) Marx Engels Collected Works (MECW) Vol.1 (London: Lawrence & Wishart) pp. 32–105.
**** Karl Marx (1975) MECW Vol 1 pp. 109–131 written between 15 January and 10 February 1842.
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Estates».* In September-November 1844 he and Friedrich Engels wrote The Holy 
Family or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against  Bruno Bauer and Company.**
Marx’s Notebook was headed «Spinoza›s Theoligisch-politischer Tractat 
(written by the calligrapher) von Karl Heinrich Marx. Berlin. 1841 (in Marx’s own 
handwriting)» – «Spinoza’s Theologico-political Treatise by Karl Heinrich Marx».*** 
Marx did not start at the beginning of the Treatise. The first transcription was from 
Chapter 6 of  the Treatise, «Of miracles».****  In particular, Marx transcribed  the 
following passage:
Further, as nothing happens in nature which does not follow from her laws, 
and as her laws embrace everything conceived by the Divine intellect, and lastly, as 
nature follows a fixed and immutable order; it most clearly follows that miracles are 
only intelligible as in relation to human opinions, and merely mean events of which 
the natural cause cannot be explained by a reference to any ordinary occurrence, 
either by us, or at any rate, by the writer and narrator of the miracle.*****
Marx next  turned to Chapter 14, «Definitions of faith»******, especially the 
following: …philosophy has no end in view save truth: faith, as we have abundantly 
proved, looks for nothing but obedience and piety. Again, philosophy is based on 
axioms which must be sought from nature alone: faith is based on history and 
language, and must be sought for only in Scripture and revelation*******...followed  by 
Chapter 15 «Theology not subservient to reason».********
At this point Marx made an abrupt shift to a later chapter focusing on more 
political issues: Chapter 20, «Freedom of  thought and  speech»********, «that in a free 
state every man may think whatever he likes, and say what he thinks»********, including:
 If men’s minds were as easily controlled as their tongues, every king would sit 
safely on his throne, and government by compulsion would cease… However, we 
have shown already that no man’s mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition 
of another, for no one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason and 
judgment, or be compelled to do so And the true aim of government is liberty.
* Karl Marx (1975)  first article  Rheinische Zeitung No.125 5 May 1842 MECW Vol 1 pp. 132–181.
** Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1975). The book was first published in February 1845, Frankfurt am 
Main. The work was never translated into English in either man’s lifetime; 1956 English translation 
by Richard Dixon and Clement Dutts and is taken from the 1845 German edition; MECW Volume 4, 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, Moscow).
*** Benedict de Spinoza A Theologico-political Treatise Unabridged Elwes Translation Dover Publications 
Inc, New York 1951. For a recent fascinating historical contextualisation of this work, see Susan James 
(2012) Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion and Politics: The Theologico-Political Treatise (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).
**** Elwes TPT (1951) pp. 81–97.
***** Elwes TPT (1951)  p. 84.
****** Elwes TPT (1951) pp. 182–189.
******* Elwes TPT  (1951) p. 189.
******** Elwes TPT  (1951) pp. 190–199.
******** Elwes TPT  (1951) pp. 257–259.
******** Elwes TPT (1951) p. 257.
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Next, Marx went back one chapter, to Chapter 19, «Of  the outward forms of 
religion» – «It is shown that the right over matters spiritual lies wholly with the 
sovereign. And that the outward forms of religion should be in accordance with 
public peace, if  we would obey God aright»; to Chapter 18, «Of  certain political 
doctrines» – «From the commonwealth of  the  Hebrews, and their history, certain 
political doctrines are deduced», to Chapter 17 «Of  the Hebrew theocracy» – «It is 
shown that no one can, or need, transfer all his rights to the sovereign power», and 
to Chapter 16, «Of  the foundations of  a state» – «Of  the natural and civil rights of 
individuals; and of  the rights of  the sovereign power». 
Marx then jumped to Chapters 7  to 13, on the interpretation of  scripture; and 
finally Chapters 1 to 5, on prophecy, prophets, divine law and ceremonial law.
What can we conclude? We have no evidence other than the choices Marx made 
in his transcription – the directions he gave to his calligrapher. First, therefore, it 
would appear that  he was grappling with religion and sorting  out  for himself 
the materialism and  indeed  substance monism which were the foundation for his 
and Engels’s work. Second, we know that issues of censorship and freedom of 
expression were the subject matter of  Marx’s  first public writings. So those were 
the sections of the Treatise to which Marx turned first. Maximilian Rubel asks: 
Comment expliquer ce curieux regroupement de chapitres?... Tout au plus 
pourrait-on presume que l’étudiant Marx a voulu retenir les enseignements du 
Traité dans l’ordre qu’il jugeait plus conforme à l’esprit et aux necessities de 
l’époque où il vivait, d’où l’inversion des deux grands themes qui font l’objet du 
Traité, la religion et la politique.
Marx and Spinoza’s Correspondence
As with the Treatise, Marx did not take the Correspondence in order. He went 
straight to Letter XXXII (XIX) from Spinoza to William de Blyenburgh, December 
1664, in which Spinoza explained why «I cannot admit that sin and evil have any 
positive existence, far less that anything can exist, or come to pass, contrary to the 
will of God».* From that  letter Marx returned to Letter II (II) of August 1661 to 
Henry Oldenberg, in which Spinoza wrote:
I will begin then by speaking briefly of God, Whom I define as a Being 
consisting in infinite attributes, whereof each is infinite or supremely perfect after 
its kind. You must observe that by attribute I mean everything which is conceived 
through itself and in itself, so that the conception of  it does not involve the 
conception of anything else. For instance, extension is conceived through itself, 
but motion is not.**
That was followed in his transcription by Letter IV (IV) from Spinoza to 
Oldenburg, with  the following highly significant passage, already referred to by 
Maidansky, as noted above:
* Elwes Corr (1951) p. 332.
** Elwes Corr (1951) p. 277.
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But you say: perhaps thought is a corporeal action: be it so, though I by no means 
grant it: you, at any rate, will not deny that extension, in so far as it is extension, is 
not thought, and this is all that is required for explaining my definition…*
Marx transcribed from letters V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XIV and  referred 
to Letter XV, from Spinoza to Henry Oldenburg, which includes:
… I will premise that I do not attribute to nature either  beauty or deformity, 
order or confusion. Only in relation to our imagination can things be called beautiful 
or deformed, ordered or confused.**
Letters XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX are  followed by Letter XXI, and XXIII. This 
contains Spinoza’s careful explanation:
… I should like briefly to explain here, in what sense I assert that a fatal 
necessity presides over all things and actions. God is in no wise subject to fate: I 
conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of God, 
in the same way as еveryone conceives that it follows from God’s nature that God 
understands himself.***
Letter XXIV is followed by Letter XXV of 7 February 1676, Spinoza to 
Oldenburg:
When I said in my former letter that we are inexcusable, because we are in the 
power of God, like clay in the hands of a potter, I meant to be understood in the 
sense, that no one can bring a complaint against God for having given him a weak 
nature or infirm spirit.****
Letter XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII (Spinoza to Simon de Vries), XXIX, XXX, and 
finally LXXIV, a magnificent retort  to Albert Burgh, his former pupil, who had 
recently become a Catholic, and had condemned  his former friends:
You cannot possibly deny, unless you have lost your memory as well as your 
reason, that in every Church there are thoroughly honourable men, who worship 
God with justice and charity.
… what distinguishes the Romish Church from others must be something 
entirely superfluous, and therefore founded solely on superstition.
For I do not presume that I have found the best philosophy, I know that I 
understand the true philosophy. If you ask in what way I know it, I answer: In the 
same way as you know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
angles…
… and also examine the history of the Church (of which I see you are completely 
ignorant), in order to see how false, in many respects, is Papal tradition, and by 
what course of events and with what cunning the Pope of Rome six hundred years 
after Christ obtained supremacy over the Church*****…
* Elwes Corr (1951) p. 283.
** Elwes Corr (1951) p. 290.
*** Elwes Corr (1951) p. 301.
**** Elwes Corr (1951) p. 305.
***** Elwes Corr (1951) p. 414–419.
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Although Marx made no transcription from Ethics or  from On the Improvement 
of the Understanding, his close attention to the Correspondence would have given 
him more than a competent understanding of Spinoza’s philosophy. However it 
is highly likely, in my view, that his motivation in selecting these passages was 
to equip himself for his left-Hegelian critique of  religion, and for his pursuit of 
radical democracy and freedom of  expression as against  the Prussian  authorities.
It has been noted that Marx entitled his transcription «Spinoza’s Theologico-
political Treatise by Karl Heinrich Marx». Like Ilyenkov, he in effect constructed 
his own Spinoza. Alexandre Matheron put  it  this way:
Ayant  éliminé ce qui, du texte de Spinoza, ne l’intéressait pas ou ne pouvait 
server à son eventual projet, Marx reconstitute un autre texte, qui a sa coherence 
proper, et dont il semble avoir tenu à faire ressortir toutes les articulations.*
Matheron provided a detailed analysis of  Marx’s  selections, and  the way that Marx 
through  his selection really did produce a Marxian Spinoza. In his view two extreme 
hypotheses were possible: «… peut-être Marx projette-t-il sur Spinoza ses propres 
idées, peut-être s’en sert-il  au contraire comme d’un repoussoir…».** Matheron’s 
conclusion was that despite Marx’s radical re-working,  Spinoza’s fundamental theses 
(les theses maîtresses) had not been falsified by him. One thing is certain: the young 
Marx was a particularly attentive reader.
Spinoza in Marx’s works
It has been pointed out that Marx seldom referred directly to Spinoza in his 
writings, and commentators such as Perry Anderson regard his few citations as «of 
the  most banal sort». That for me shows a lack of attention by Anderson.*** Indeed, 
certain citations are of great interest, in showing precisely how Marx deployed 
Spinoza explicitly.
In his 1842 «Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction», 
referred to above, Marx wrote the following:
«Verum index sui et falsi» (Truth is the touchstone of itself and of falsehood 
(Spinoza, Ethics Part II, Prop 43)****  «As the light makes both itself and the darkness 
plain, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false».*****
and a few pages later he referred to Kant, Fichte and Spinoza.
In 1844, in The Holy Family, he wrote:
The dispute between Strauss and Bauer over Substance and Self-Consciousness 
is a dispute within Hegelian speculation. In Hegel there are three elements, Spinoza’s 
Substance, Fichte’s Self-Consciousness and Hegel’s necessarily antagonistic unity 
* Alexandre Matheron (1977) “Le Traité Theologico-Politique vu par le jeune Marx” Cahiers Spinoza 
Numéro 1 Éditions Réplique, Paris, pp. 159–212,  p. 161.
** Matheron (1977)  p. 212.
*** Perry Anderson (1976) Considerations on Western Marxism (London: New Left Books) p. 64 fn. 30.
**** Penguin (1996) p. 58.
***** “Comments on  the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction” MECW Vol 1 pp.109–131 written between 
15 January and 10 February 1842, at p. 112.
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of the two, the Absolute Spirit. The first element is metaphysically disguised nature 
separated from man; the second is metaphysically disguised spirit separated from 
nature; the third is the metaphysically disguised unity of both, real man and the real 
human species.
Within the domain of theology, Strauss expounds Hegel from Spinoza’s point 
of view, and Bauer does so from Fichte’s point of view, both quite consistently. 
They both criticised Hegel insofar as with him each of the two elements was 
falsified by the other, whereas they carried each of these elements to its one-sided 
and hence consistent development. — Both of them therefore go beyond Hegel 
in their criticism, but both also remain within his speculation and each represents 
only one side of his system. Feuerbach, who completed and criticised Hegel from 
Hegel’s point of view by resolving the metaphysical Absolute Spirit  into «real 
man on the basis of nature», was the first to complete the criticism of religion by 
sketching in a grand and masterly manner the basic features of the criticism of 
Hegel’s speculation and hence of all metaphysics.*
Finally, in 1858, in the Grundrisse, unpublished until 1939, Marx wrote:
The act of  production is therefore in all its moments also an act of consumption. 
But the economists admit  this. Production as directly identical with consumption, 
and consumption as directly coincident with production, is termed by them 
productive consumption.  This identity of production and consumption amounts to 
Spinoza’s thesis: determinatio est negatio. – note 11. ‘Determination is negation’, 
i.e. given the undifferentiated  self-identity of the universal world substance, 
to attempt to introduce particular determinations is to negate this self-identity. 
(Spinoza, Letters, No.50, to J. Jelles, 2 June 1674.).**
This incidentally shows that Marx was familiar with letters of Spinoza which 
he had not transcribed.
Although he intended to do so, Marx never wrote a text dealing specifically 
with philosophy, and instead turned his attention from very early to a critique of 
political economy. 
But strong claims, with which I agree, have been made for Marx’s Spinozism. 
Yirmiyahu Yovel, in his Spinoza and Other Heretics***, asserted that
Marx used Spinoza’s thought far more than he admitted. Spinoza was above 
all a counterbalance and corrective to Hegel, restoring the concept of nature and 
man as a concrete, natural being from what seemed to Marx his immersion in the 
lofty and semireligious heights of the Hegelian Geist… Marx’s new philosophy 
of immanence, though strongly influenced by Hegel and his milieu, goes back 
to Spinoza in more ways than one. Indeed, Spinoza is almost always present in 
* Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Criticism.
** Against Bruno Bauer and Company Chapter VI 3) f) The Speculative Cycle of Absolute Criticism 
and the Philos-ophy of Self-Consciousness at. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-
family/ch06_3_f.htm
*** MECW Volume 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975. 
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Marx’s thought. But, we may add, the actual presence of Spinoza in Marx far 
surpasses his direct mention by name.
In the view of  Maximilien Rubel, «Les traces ‘spinoziennes’ dans  la 
correspondence de Marx, sans être fréquentes, témoignent de  l’intensité de cette 
rencontre».* Yovel also confirmed my sense that Marx turned to Spinoza especially 
for the critique of  religion:
Just as the young Marx was ploughing his way through Spinoza’s Theologico-
Political Treatise and affixing his own name to the excerpts he diligently copied 
from it, Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity (1841) was bringing Spinoza’s critique 
of religion up-to-date. The link between the two books was too timely and apparent 
for Marx to overlook.**
Yovel  further identified correctly the manner in which Marx read in order to 
equip himself for the struggle with the Prussians:
But Marx, diligent student of the Theologico-Political Treatise, could not fail 
to see the link it established between theory and practice on the one hand, and 
between political and religious emancipation on the other.***
Finally, Yovel, without referring  to Ilyenkov, identified precisely the manner 
in which Ilyenkov would, without knowing about Marx’s transcriptions, discover 
a rich source of inspiration in (his own) Spinoza:
The entity which Marx considers ontologically self-sufficient is not «nature» in 
the homogenous sense of Spinoza, but a dialectical interaction of nature and man, 
whereby each affects the other in a practical mode (work, shaping, reproduction). 
The hyphenated term man-in-nature seems more adequate to express this idea than 
Marx’s man and nature, since Marx clearly does not have a simple conjunction in 
mind but a dialectical reciprocity.
This is Ilyenkov’s «thinking body», in the context of his «activity philosophy».
Conclusion
Eugene Holland has summarised****  the return of  Spinoza  in the 20th century, 
and his impact on Marxist and critical thinkers in the post-WWII period:
Althusser’s efforts to expunge Hegelianism from Marx’s work involved 
replacing Hegel with Spinoza in many respects, although the extent of Althusser’s 
reliance on and confidence in Spinoza remains unclear.***** More dramatically, 
Antonio Negri has argued in favor of Spinoza’s materialism, suggesting it is 
an important, early-modern precursor of Marx’s fully modern materialism.****** 
* Rubel (1977)  p. 24.
** Rubel (1977)  p. 80.
*** Yovel (1992)  p. 83. 
**** Eugene Holland (1998) “Spinoza and Marx” Cultural Logic, v.2, n.1, at.  mhttp://clogic.eserver.org/2-1/
holland.html
***** See Louis Althusser (1997) “The Only Materialist Tradition” in Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (eds) The 
New Spinoza (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 3–20. 
****** Antonio Negri (1999) The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics 
(Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press).
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Pierre Macherey has staged a direct confrontation between Spinoza and Hegel, 
stressing the degree to which the former eludes the grasp of the latter’s history 
of philosophy, and therefore represents an important alternative to Hegelian 
views.* Gilles Deleuze, finally, has mined the western philosophical tradition for 
alternatives to Hegel, among which Spinoza must be counted as one of the most 
important.**
To these should  be added Althusser’s co-worker Etienne Balibar, whose 
Spinoza and Politics is in my view and perhaps his, one of his best works.*** And 
Vesa Oittinen has analysed Althusser’s «left-voluntarist» reading of Spinoza****, 
especially in Reading Capital.*****
Recently, the intellectual historian Jonathan Israel has written a series of books 
seeking to reinstate Spinoza as a philosopher  in his own time, and as a key figure 
of  the enlightenment and its intellectual and political explosions.****** Israel has been 
joined by the almost equally prolific philosopher Steven Nadler.******* I mentioned in 
my Introduction Moses Hess and the remark attributed to him that Spinoza  was the 
prophet of  the  French Revolution. The religion-inclined historian Samuel Moyn, 
a scholar of  Emanuel  Levinas, who regards the Enlightenment and especially 
the French Revolution as diversions in human history and the history of  ideas********, 
reprimanded  Israel  for suggesting, in effect, that Spinoza caused the French 
Revolution.******** There followed an acerbic exchange in which Israel described Moyn’s 
review as nonsense, and asked Moyn  whether he should be described as a gnat 
or a vulture********. Connoisseurs of academic sword-play should consult these articles. 
The more serious point is that Spinoza arouses the same degree of  controversy and 
passion as he did in his own time, in Marx’s time, and in the USSR. 
* Pierre Macherey (2012) Hegel or Spinoza (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). 
** Gilles Deleuze (1992) Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (New York: Zone Books); and Gilles 
Deleuze (1988) Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (San Francisco: City of Lights Books).
*** Etienne Balibar (2008) Spinoza and Politics (London: Verso).
**** Vesa Oittinen (1994) “Althussers linksvoluntarische Spinoza-Lektüre”, pp. 19–24 in Vesa Oittinen 
Spinozistische Dialektik (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang).
***** Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar (2009) Reading Capital (London, Verso). 
****** Jonathan I. Israel (2002) Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 
(new ed Oxford: OUP); (2008) Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation 
of Man 1670-1752  (Oxford: OUP); (2011) Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and 
Human Rights 1750-1790 (Oxford: OUP); (2011) A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and 
the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
******* Steven Nadler (2001) Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press);(2006) Spinoza’s 
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Just as with Marx and  Ilyenkov, Spinoza has been deployed in order to serve as 
a foundation for systems of  ideas which Spinoza would never have countenanced. 
Both Marx and Ilyenkov read Spinoza very closely indeed, and were profoundly 
influenced by a variety of his works. They both (re)constructed their own Spinozas, 
for their own purposes. I am sure Ilyenkov would  have been delighted to find 
that Marx was like him excited and confirmed in his outlook by Spinoza; I do 
not think he would in any way have changed his «action philosophy». In the final 
analysis, Spinoza is in no way diminished by these very different engagements: his 
continuing relevance and power are strikingly confirmed.
Түйін
Билл Бауринг 
Егер Ильенков Спинозаға берілген маркстік түсініктемені білсе ше?
Мақала кеңестік кезеңнің көрнекті философтарының бірі Э.В. Ильенковтың 
өз диалектикалық логикасы, диалектика тарихы мен мінсіздік мәселесін зерт-
теу концепциясының аясында Б. Спинозаның шығармашылығын түсіндірудің 
ерекшеліктері мен оны түсінуді айқындауға арналған. Мақалада талқыланатын 
маңызды сұрақтардың ішінде Маркс ілімі ізбасарларының спинозизмді түсіндіру 
ерекшелігі – «Спиноза және Маркс» тақырыбы. Осы «желілерден» автордың 
негізгі тезистерінің бірі байқалады: Маркс пен оның ізбасарларының Спиноза 
философиясына аса зейін қоюы материалдық негіздегі диалектиканың теориясы 
мен әдіснамасының дамуына деген терең қызығушылықпен негізделген. Спиноза 
философиясын қолданудағы Маркс пен Ильенковтың «өзіндік ерекшеліктері» мен 
«мақсаттарын» ескерген жағдайда да, Спиноза ілімінің өзектілігі мен қуаттылығы 
мінсіз болып қала береді.
Резюме
Билл Бауринг 
Что, если бы Ильенков знал марксовскую трактовку Спинозы?
 Статья посвящена прояснению понимания и особенностей интерпретации 
творчества Б. Спинозы одним из выдающихся философов советского периода 
Э.В. Ильенковым в контексте его собственной концепции диалектической логики, 
исследования истории диалектики, проблемы идеального и т. д. Среди важных во-
просов, обсуждаемых в статье, тема «Спиноза и Маркс», особенности интерпрета-
ции спинозизма марксистами. В этих «сюжетных линиях» прослеживается один из 
центральных тезисов автора: пристальное внимание Маркса и его последователей к 
философии Спинозы было обусловлено глубоким интересом к развитию  теории и 
методологии диалектики на материалистических основаниях. И при всех «собствен-
ных целях» и «особенностях» использования философии Спинозы у Маркса, Ильен-
кова и др., несомненными остаются актуальность и мощь учения Спинозы.
What if  Ilyenkov had Known Marx’s Transcription of  Spinoza?
